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American defense of Taiwan

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Distribution map of US military bases. There are more than 5,000 military bases in total, including 600 overseas bases.[1]

American defense of Taiwan refers to the policy by which the United States provides military aid, security assurances, and diplomatic support to help Taiwan safeguard its national security. This policy began with the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China between the United States and the Government of the Republic of China in 1954. However, after the United States established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China in 1979, the treaty was unilaterally terminated by the U.S. It was subsequently replaced by the Taiwan Relations Act, a domestic U.S. law.

Under the U.S. defense commitment to Taiwan, the United States provides defensive weapons, intelligence sharing, military training, military advisors, and other forms of support to Taiwan. The Federal government of the United States also supports Taiwan's participation in international matters, such as inviting Taiwanese delegations to attend President of the United States inaugurations.

The American defense of Taiwan commitment to Taiwan has broad support within Taiwan, but it is opposed by the government of the People's Republic of China. Mainland China considers Taiwan an inseparable part of China and opposes any foreign military intervention in Taiwan's affairs. In recent years, pressure and threats from mainland China toward Taiwan have intensified, drawing international attention.

In April 2001, POTUS George W. Bush publicly announced the American defense of Taiwan.[2] In 2017, the National Security Council introduced the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, which, in the event of armed conflict between the United States and the People's Republic of China, includes "defending countries in the first island chain, including Taiwan." This framework was approved by President Donald John Trump in 2018.[3] In February 2021, United States Congress reintroduced the "Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act," which aims to legally authorize the U.S. president to use limited force to defend Taiwan if necessary.[4]

History

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Before the severance of diplomatic relations

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After the severance of diplomatic relations

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In 1996, the Taiwan Strait Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, and the United States deployed the Seventh Fleet to assist in defending Taiwan and stabilizing the situation.[5]

In April 2001, POTUS George W. Bush declared that the United States would "do everything it can to defend Taiwan."[6] His successor, President Barack Hussein Obama, did not make any public or clear statements regarding the use of force by the People's Republic of China to unify Taiwan by force, nor about U.S. military intervention to defend Taiwan. In 2018, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific approved by President Donald Trump included the goal of "defending Taiwan."

The sources of law basis for the American defense of Taiwan —the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances—states that "the U.S. government has not made specific commitments." Therefore, "from a legal and 'obligational' perspective," "although the U.S. government could potentially decide on 'appropriate actions to be taken by the president and Congress according to constitutional procedures,' it is also very likely that no military intervention will be taken after such a decision."[7] Hence, during the presidencies of Donald Trump and Joe Biden, United States Congress have continuously pushed for Bill (United States Congress) to legally authorize the American defense of Taiwan.

During the George W. Bush Administration

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In 2001, the new U.S. government viewed the People's Republic of China as a strategic competitor and adopted a tougher policy. [6] On April 24, the U.S. announced List of US arms sales to Taiwan (consisting of three arms deals). On April 25,[2] newly inaugurated POTUS George W. Bush stated on ABC's Good Morning America that the U.S. decision to sell Taiwan this package of weapons was "the right package for the moment."[8] He also emphasized that the U.S. would "do whatever it took to defend herself,"[8] or, in other words, would do everything possible to assist Taiwan in defending itself.[6] The media interpreted this as an indication that the U.S. was prepared to directly intervene in a Taiwan Strait conflict. Bush's statement marked a shift in U.S. policy from "strategic ambiguity" to "strategic clarity."[2][8]

On April 26, during an interview with CNN, Bush was asked about his stance on Taiwan. He responded, "I want to express to the people that we hope to resolve any differences peacefully. But as people know, I am willing to help Taiwan defend itself. For me (our) policy has not changed, as other presidents have said, and I will continue to say that." When asked about the U.S. response if taiwan independence movement and conflict arose, he said, "Of course, I hope Taiwan adheres to the 'One China' principle. Declaring Taiwan's independence is not in line with the 'One China' policy, and we will work with Taiwan to ensure that does not happen. We need to resolve this issue peacefully."[8]

On May 17, Bush met with U.S. community leaders of Asian-Pacific descent at the White House. He reiterated that if China were to use force, the U.S. would assist Taiwan. [2] The following year, during a visit to China, Bush reaffirmed the U.S. government's "One China" policy, stating, "When my country reaches an agreement (referring to the three Communiqués), we will adhere to it. But there is also the Taiwan Relations Act, and I respect this law. It states that if Taiwan is attacked, we will help it defend itself. However, we also make it clear that neither side should provoke the other, and that peaceful dialogue should be pursued."[8]

During the Trump Administration

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In 2018, President Donald Trump initiated the China–United States trade war, leading to Second Cold War. On June 10, 2020, Republican Party Senator Josh Hawley introduced the Taiwan Defense Act in the United States Senate. On June 30, Republican Representatives Ted Yoho and Mike Gallagher introduced the same bill in the United States House of Representatives. On July 29, Ted Yoho introduced the Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act (H.R. 7855)[9], which sought to clarify and strengthen the U.S. commitment to defending Taiwan in the event of an armed attack, stating that "the bill draws a red line for Beijing, asserting that Taiwan's future must be determined peacefully." Earlier, on July 17, Ted Yoho told Fox Business host Lou Dobbs that, "The bill will clearly specify that if China invades Taiwan, it will authorize the U.S. president to use force in response, with a 5-year sunset provision."[10] Due to the timing of the 2020 United States presidential election, the bill did not make it to the agenda.[4]

On January 5, 2021, just days before President Donald Trump’s departure from office, the White House National Security Council declassified a 2017 document outlining the Free and Open Indo-Pacific. The document, approved by President Trump in February 2018, was released to the public on January 12, 2021. Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Robert O'Brien stated in the declassified memorandum that the document transparently demonstrates the U.S. commitment to the Indo-Pacific region and its strategic partnerships. On January 12, the White House National Security Council released documents.[3] The document specifically addressed one of China’s seven major objectives, which was to "prevent China from using force against the U.S. and its allies and partners, while developing capabilities and plans to defeat China in various conflicts." Among the defense strategies outlined, three key points were identified:

  1. Deny China continuous air and naval dominance in the first island chain during a conflict;
  2. Defend the first island chain nations, including Taiwan;
  3. Dominate all areas outside the first island chain.[11][3]

During the Biden Administration

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On January 20, 2021, President Joe Biden took office and continued a tough policy toward China, with the China–United States trade war ongoing. After the new Congress convened, on February 18, Republican Senator Rick Scott and Representative Guy Reschenthaler reintroduced the Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act[4] in both the Senate and House of Representatives. Rick Scott's proposal (S.332 - Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act[12]) aimed to:

  • Help Taiwan counter Communist China's military buildup across the Taiwan Strait;
  • Establish a limited authorization for the president to use military force specifically to secure and protect Taiwan from armed attack.[13]

In response to the military pressure from the People's Republic of China, Richard Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, and certain U.S. lawmakers advocated for the U.S. government to adopt a strategy of "strategic clarity" to deter the possibility of China using force to liberation of Taiwan. On April 29, the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services held a hearing on global threats the U.S. faces. When Committee Chairman, Democratic Senator Jack Reed, asked whether the U.S. should shift from a policy of strategic ambiguity to one of making clear commitments to Taiwan, the Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines responded that the People's Republic of China would view the U.S. commitment to Taiwan as "creating tremendous instability," which could lead China to "aggressively undermine U.S. interests globally." She also noted that such a policy shift "could potentially" push Taiwan further toward declaring independence.[14]

On May 4, during a discussion hosted by the Financial Times, Kurt Campbell, the U.S. National Security Council’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Coordinator, responded to calls from U.S. figures urging the government to clarify its position on defending Taiwan. He stated that such a clear commitment would have "significant drawbacks." He warned that if the People's Republic of China (PRC) were to use force to unify Taiwan and the U.S. intervened to defend Taiwan, any conflict arising between the PRC and the U.S. over Taiwan would "not likely be confined to a small geographic area." He continued, saying, "I think it would quickly escalate and fundamentally destroy the global economy in ways that no one could predict."[15]

On October 21, during a CNN interview, President Joe Biden was asked, "If China attacks Taiwan, will the U.S. defend Taiwan?" [16]Biden answered twice, "Yes, we have a commitment." [16]On October 22, White House Press Secretary stated, "The President's comments do not signal any change in our policy. Our policy remains unchanged." On the same day, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, while at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, affirmed U.S. support for Taiwan's forces but refused to confirm Biden’s statements regarding military defense of Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, when asked about the risk of NATO forces being involved in a potential U.S.-PRC conflict over Taiwan, declined to "speculate on a hypothetical situation."[17]

In April 2022, former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe published an article in a U.S. newspaper, comparing Taiwan to Ukraine and urging the U.S. to make a clear commitment to defend Taiwan. On April 15, Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China Zhao Lijian, during a regular press conference, responded by stating, "Some Japanese politicians have repeatedly made irresponsible comments on Taiwan, interfering in China's internal affairs, provoking great power confrontation, and with ulterior motives. China strongly opposes this. Taiwan is an inseparable part of China's territory. The Taiwan issue is entirely China's internal matter, fundamentally different from the issue of Ukraine, and there is no comparison to be made. Japan once colonized Taiwan for half a century, committing numerous atrocities and bearing serious historical responsibility to the Chinese people. Japanese politicians should be especially cautious on the Taiwan issue and avoid sending the wrong signals to 'Taiwan independence' forces."[18]

On May 23, 2022, U.S. President Joe Biden, during his visit to Japan, clearly stated at a joint press conference with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida that the U.S. would deploy American troops to assist in defending Taiwan. [19]The next day, Biden clarified that the U.S. would maintain its "strategic ambiguity" policy toward Taiwan.[20]

On September 17, 2022, Biden reiterated, during an interview with CBS's 60 Minutes, that the U.S. would deploy forces to defend Taiwan if China were to attack.[21]

On November 16, 2023, during talks with President Biden, Chinese President Xi Jinping reaffirmed China's firm stance on peaceful reunification with Taiwan and called for the U.S. to halt arms sales to Taiwan and support its peaceful unification. In response, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin stated that the U.S. would continue to take necessary actions in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act to help Taiwan obtain means of self-defense.[22][23]

Defense measures

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U.S. military defense

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On April 4, 2021, in the Philippine Sea, U.S. Navy officers of the Mustin destroyer stood on their feet and looked at the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning . In 2021, the U.S. Navy has 11 carrier battle groups, and the PLA Navy has 2.

Wang Yunfei, a senior researcher at the Hong Kong San Ce Think Tank, divides the U.S. defense of Taiwan into two types in terms of space: short-range assistance and long-range assistance. Short-range assistance is provided by United States Forces Japan and United States Forces Korea. Long-distance assistance includes support from the Contiguous United States worldwide in the United States.[1]

In his 2004 article, Wang Yifeng, an author from the People's Republic of China, pointed out that the military forces used by the United States to defend Taiwan are mainly 300,000 troops from the US Pacific Command and part of the Japan Self-Defense Forces. The United States Seventh Fleet is the main force. There are three military defense modes:[24]

  • Vietnam mode
    • Similar to the Vietnam War, the US military concentrated its main forces to implement a key maritime blockade and rapid deployment against the People's Republic of China.
  • North Korea mode
    • Similar to the Korean War, the US military directly sent part of its forces to Taiwan.
  • Japanese mode

In a 2006 article, author Hai Wei pointed out that, due to the well-known fact that "Americans are afraid of casualties in war," the U.S. military would not land in Taiwan and engage in ground combat with the People's Liberation Army (PLA). He argued, "Not to mention the chances of victory, the foreseeable massive casualties would be too much for the U.S. to bear." [25]Based on the personnel and equipment of the PLA at the time, Hai Wei believed that a Chinese military unification of Taiwan "would be no problem," and that when facing joint U.S. and Japanese defense assistance to Taiwan, the PLA would have "a good chance of success."[25]

In his speculation on how the U.S. would defend Taiwan, Hai Wei suggested that the U.S. Navy would form a joint fleet with two or three aircraft carrier battle group and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. This joint fleet would use its significant sea and air superiority to contain or even overwhelm the PLA’s naval and air forces, then further attack PLA landing forces with carrier-based aircraft and strike radar stations and missile bases on China’s southeastern coast, forcing the People's Republic of China "to come to the negotiating table." He described this as a "relatively safe option for the U.S. and Japan, with losses that are manageable." Hai Wei speculated that the U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups would engage in combat with the PLA 600 kilometers east of the Taiwan Strait. He argued that in the contest for air supremacy over the Taiwan Strait between the PLA and the U.S.-Japan-Taiwan alliance, it would be difficult for the PLA to organize an effective strike against U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups. Without air superiority, the PLA would not be able to win the war merely by relying on the deterrence effect of its nuclear submarines. At the time, the PLA's Sukhoi Su-30 and JH-7 aircraft had a combat radius of only about 1,000 kilometers, which was insufficient to pose a major threat to the U.S. fleet. Hai Wei hoped to introduce no fewer than 12 and ideally 40 Russian Tupolev Tu-22M, which would allow the PLA to "saturation attack" on the U.S. carrier strike groups, helping the PLA "concentrate superior forces to fight for air superiority in the theater, at least enabling relative control over airspace in the Taiwan Strait, so as not to be overwhelmed by the swarm of U.S. fighter jets." [25]

Regarding the use of U.S. military bases in South Korea and Japan, Hai Wei speculated that South Korea, due to its "good relations" with the People's Republic of China, might not allow the U.S. military to "use its airports to launch combat aircraft." The U.S. Pacific Air Forces' 5th Air Force, based at Kadena Air Base in Japan, would become the primary "fortress" for the U.S. and Japan during wartime. Hai Wei also noted that the PLA might target U.S. and Japanese military facilities in Japan, such as bases in Nagasaki, Yokohama, and Yokosuka, to prevent the U.S.-Japan defense of Taiwan. To avoid a "total war" between China, Japan, and the U.S., Hai Wei stated that the U.S. would "use these bases very ‘restrainedly’ (Aerial refueling, Lockheed P-3 Orion, etc.), not making them major wartime airfields, but relying more on its aircraft carrier strike groups."[25]

After the 2010s, as the armed forces of the People's Republic of China increased, Wang Yunfei’s article noted that in a military conflict not involving land targets, the PLA could complete its military objectives against the U.S. forces stationed in Japan and South Korea within three days. If the U.S. were to provide long-range assistance to Taiwan, it would need to deploy no fewer than five aircraft carrier battle group, similar to the number used in the Iraq War.[1]

Non-Military Measures

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The United States may consider taking a range of non-military measures to counter Chinese actions, including economic sanctions such as trade suspensions, embargoes, maritime blockades, freezing financial assets, and imposing financial restrictions. Cyber warfare and the disruption of satellite navigation systems could also be part of the U.S. strategy in addressing tensions with China.

China, being the second-largest economy in the world after the United States, heavily depends on international markets for its economic growth.[26] In the financial sector, there is widespread belief that the U.S. government has the capability to impose a financial blockade on China, potentially removing it from the SWIFT system, which is the global payment and settlement network dominated by the U.S. dollar.[26][27] A 2020 report from Guotai Junan, a Chinese investment bank, estimated that if China were cut off from SWIFT, it could lose up to $300 billion in trade, over $90 billion in foreign direct investment, and $80 billion in outward investment annually.However, experts note that the likelihood of China being excluded from SWIFT is low, given the potential risks it could pose to both the U.S. and global economies. Articles on the Voice of America website related to the China–United States trade war indicated that, much like North Korea and Iran, China’s exclusion from SWIFT would introduce considerable economic instability worldwide. Nevertheless, Chinese officials and research institutions continue to discuss the potential consequences of such an action and measures to mitigate risks.In response to this possibility, China has been developing its own payment systems.[27]

In 2015, the People's Bank of China launched the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) to reduce dependency on SWIFT. Furthermore, Taiwanese authors, citing China's economic strength and the U.S. government's relatively passive stance during Hong Kong's anti-extradition protests, suggest that the U.S. may not resort to military intervention or non-military actions like economic sanctions if China were to use force against Taiwan.[28]

A 2020 article from The New York Times Chinese Edition pointed out that China could address food and oil security concerns by increasing its domestic food production, building up oil reserves, and securing long-term oil supply contracts with producing countries. In the face of economic sanctions, the Chinese government plans to focus on reducing its reliance on overseas markets and critical technologies by transitioning to an "internal circulation" model over the next 15 years. This self-reliance strategy, embedded in China’s 14th Five-Year Plan and Vision 2035 goals, reflects a war preparedness consideration, enabling China to weather potential Western blockades.[26]

On June 16, 2022, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Robert Menendez (D) and Lindsey Graham (R) introduced the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022. The bill includes measures such as imposing sanctions on China in the event of an invasion of Taiwan, providing $4.5 billion in aid to Taiwan over four years, granting Taiwan the status of a "Major Non-NATO Ally," and renaming the "Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office" in Washington to the "Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office." These steps signify a significant strengthening of U.S. commitment to Taiwan, reflecting the ongoing geopolitical tensions in the region.

U.S. Military Presence in Taiwan

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In June 2004, mainstream media in Taiwan reported that U.S. military officers had arrived in Taiwan, with preparations to re-establish a U.S. military presence by 2006 to assist in the defense of Taiwan.[24] In 2020, amid the backdrop of intensified U.S.-China confrontation, the issue of re-stationing U.S. forces in Taiwan was raised again before potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait. On March 7, Ian Easton of the "2049 Institute" wrote an op-ed titled "The U.S. Should Deploy Troops to Taiwan," advocating for the establishment of a mixed force of 1,000 personnel from the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps to be stationed in Taiwan. In June, rumors began circulating online in Taiwan about the potential re-deployment of U.S. forces to Taiwan, with false reports claiming that U.S. troops from Germany would be transferred to Taiwan, that the number of U.S. troops would increase to 50,000, and that at least three military bases would be constructed. Reports also included claims that Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II, THAAD anti-missile systems, between 5,000 and 20,000 medium-range ballistic missile, and even nuclear weapons would be deployed.[29]

In the September/October edition of the Military Review magazine, a series of articles focused on the theme of “China's military aggression against Taiwan.”[29][30] Among them, U.S. Marine Corps Captain Walker D. Mills wrote an article titled "Deterring the Dragon: Returning U.S. Forces to Taiwan",[31] calling on the U.S. to reconsider deploying ground forces to Taiwan. [29] Another article suggested that the U.S. military could deploy four divisions and heavy equipment to Taiwan.[30] Captain Mills' article sparked attention across Taiwan’s political spectrum.[31] Researcher Ou Xifu, from the Institute for National Defense and Security Research Institute's Institute for Chinese Political-Military and Operational Concepts, wrote that Walker D. Mills' “bold suggestion, published in a U.S. military journal, was considered unthinkable until now but highlights the significant shift in the U.S. view on defending Taiwan.” Mills' proposal was seen as akin to reviving the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty and the Successful Combat Plan. In the combat division of labor outlined in the Successful Combat Plan, Taiwan would be responsible for ground combat, while the U.S. would handle air defense, naval surface operations, and air force attacks.[32]

In September 2020, the Chinese state-run media Global Times published an editorial titled "U.S. Military Re-deployment to Taiwan? That Would Mean War," stating, "The discussion in U.S. military magazines can be seen as part of a propaganda war against China, attempting to create new space for the U.S. strategy of pressuring China. If the U.S. military truly does this, it will not only mean the complete end of the U.S. 'One China' policy but will also constitute a blatant challenge to China's sovereignty. This kind of message is recklessly provocative. We must tell both the U.S. and Taiwan that they must abandon any fantasies about the re-deployment of U.S. forces to Taiwan, because it will inevitably mean war." The editorial further explained that "the re-deployment of U.S. forces to Taiwan" would meet the second and third conditions for military action against Taiwan as stipulated in China's Anti-Secession Law. "We believe that at that time, the PLA will inevitably take military action and launch a just war to liberate Taiwan."[30]

Wang Kunyi, the chairman and professor of the Taiwan International Strategic Studies Association, also wrote that if U.S. forces were to re-deploy to Taiwan, it would trigger war, ultimately leading to "millions of deaths."[29] In an article written earlier in 2004, Wang Yifeng described the re-deployment of U.S. forces to Taiwan as essentially tearing up the Three Communiqués, which would inevitably lead not only to a confrontation across the Taiwan Strait but also to a complete breakdown in U.S.-China relations, creating a major global crisis.[24]

On October 22, 2020, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) held a seminar in Washington, D.C. Former Chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) Richard Bush stated that the re-deployment of U.S. forces to Taiwan would undermine the conditions set for the normalization of U.S.-China relations in the 1970s (the Three Communiqués). He speculated that this would put enormous pressure on Beijing, possibly leading China to demand the termination or cancellation of diplomatic relations with the United States.[33]

Various Perspectives

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Republic of China (Taiwan)

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In late September 2020, a poll conducted by the Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation revealed that 60% of Taiwanese adults over the age of 20 believed that the U.S. would likely intervene militarily to defend Taiwan if China were to use force against Taiwan, while 33% disagreed. The chairman of the Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation, You Yinglong, stated that this finding shows that the vast majority of Taiwanese people believe that if China uses force against Taiwan, the U.S. may come to Taiwan’s defense.[34]

In a poll conducted by ETtoday News Cloud in October 2020, assuming a military conflict across the Taiwan Strait, 54.0% of respondents believed that the U.S. would defend Taiwan, while 35.0% did not believe so. Moreover, 55.7% of respondents supported a more radical stance of "U.S. troops stationed in Taiwan to defend Taiwan," while 30.7% did not.[35] A December 2020 poll showed that 48.0% of respondents believed that U.S. President-elect Joe Biden would not defend Taiwan.[36] However, a March 2022 poll conducted after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war revealed that 55.9% of respondents believed the U.S. would not intervene militarily to defend Taiwan.[37]

In an article published in 2008, Associate Professor Zhang Ziyang of Nanhua University argued that "Taiwan is full of confidence in U.S. defense of Taiwan," but this confidence is largely based on U.S. misinformation. Specifically, Taiwan assumes that it holds high strategic importance for the U.S., while the quality of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan is low, leading Taiwan to reasonably assume that the U.S.[38] would come to its defense. He further noted that "Taiwan’s excessive confidence in U.S. defense" leads China to reasonably question whether the U.S. has made a secret commitment to Taiwan. This is especially true with the installation of long-range early warning radar systems, which makes Taiwan a part of the U.S. early warning system. China thus has more reason to doubt whether the U.S. and Taiwan have secretly committed to assisting each other in defending their national security.[38]

On February 19, 2021, in response to the U.S. Congressional proposal of the "Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act," the spokesperson for Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ou Jiang'an, expressed gratitude to the U.S. Congress for the various pro-Taiwan actions taken by members of both the Senate and the House of Representatives. He highlighted that this demonstrated a strong commitment to Taiwan’s security and regional peace and stability, and strongly supported Taiwan-U.S. military and security cooperation.[4]

People's Republic of China (PRC)

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Chinese author Hai Wei believes that militarily, if China can achieve its strategic objective of effectively preventing U.S. defense assistance to Taiwan, "liberation of Taiwan will just be a matter of time."[25] Other authors politically link this issue with the Taiwan independence movement, describing pro-independence elements as "emboldened by an important lifeline" and as a result of "frequent mistaken signals, especially from the U.S."[24]

In 2020, as cross-strait relations and U.S.-China relations continued to worsen, Wang Shushen, the director of the Taiwan and U.S. Studies Office at the Institute of Taiwan Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,[39] wrote that the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) authorities under Tsai Ing-wen, in addition to cooperating with the U.S. government and escalating tensions between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, also utilized the rhetoric of U.S. defense of Taiwan to "reinforce the U.S. 'support Taiwan' narrative, spread the 'Taiwan independence is harmless' argument to the people on the island, and place Taiwan's security in the illusory idea of U.S. defense." He continued, "For Taiwan, the idea that the U.S. 'fights for Taiwan independence' is a fantasy. The U.S. only sees Taiwan as a bargaining chip to be traded and sacrificed."[40]

On October 6, 2020, the Kuomintang (KMT) legislative caucus proposed and passed two motions in the Legislative Yuan: "The government should request U.S. security assistance in resisting the Communist Party," and "Resumption of Taiwan-U.S. diplomatic relations." In response, Global Times, the Chinese state-run media, published an editorial condemning these motions, calling them "proposals to promote U.S. military defense of Taiwan" and "resumption of Taiwan-U.S. diplomatic relations." The article asserted that "Regardless of the motivations, both proposals are of a 'Taiwan independence' nature and must be strongly condemned."[41]

References

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  15. ^ 莉 (2021-05-05). "坎贝尔:美若在台湾问题上实行"战略清晰"有"重大不利面"" [Campbell: If the US implements "strategic clarity" on the Taiwan issue, there will be "significant disadvantages"]. 美国之音网站. Retrieved 2025-04-04.
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  18. ^ "2022年4月15日外交部发言人赵立坚主持例行记者会" [Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian's Regular Press Conference on April 15, 2022]. 中华人民共和国外交部网站. 2022-04-15. Retrieved 2025-04-04.
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  23. ^ "拜习会后 美国防长重申对台湾武器承诺" [After Biden-Xi meeting, US Defense Secretary reiterates arms commitment to Taiwan]. 法国国际广播电台. 2023-11-16. Retrieved 2025-04-04.
  24. ^ a b c d 王逸峰 (2004). 美国协防台湾战略剖析 [Analysis of the US's Strategy of Assisting Taiwan Defense]. 舰载武器 (河南省郑州市: 郑州机电工程研究所). pp. (2004年第8期): 12—16.
  25. ^ a b c d e 海桅 (2006). "浅析引进"逆火"对中国海防的作用和战略意义" [A brief analysis of the role and strategic significance of introducing "Backfire" to China's coastal defense]. 舰载武器 (河南省郑州市: 郑州机电工程研究所): (2006年第2期): 25—27.
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  29. ^ a b c d 王昆义 (2020-09-26). "美军驻台会"千万人头落地"?" [Will the US military stationed in Taiwan result in “millions of deaths”?]. 台海网. Retrieved 2025-04-05.
  30. ^ a b c 魏少璞 (2020-09-24). "社评:美军重新进驻台湾?那将意味着战争" [Editorial: Will the US military re-enter Taiwan? That will mean war]. 环球日报. Retrieved 2025-04-05.
  31. ^ a b 张永泰 (2020-09-23). "美国陆军刊物文章建议美军重返台湾 引发台朝野热议" [An article in a U.S. Army publication suggested that U.S. troops return to Taiwan, sparking heated debate in Taiwan]. 美国之音网站. Retrieved 2025-04-05.
  32. ^ 欧锡富 (2020-11-29). "美國協防台灣的戰略自主選項" [The United States' strategic autonomy options for defending Taiwan]. Yahoo 奇摩新闻. Retrieved 2025-04-05.
  33. ^ 记者:张文馨 (2020-10-04). "美軍重新駐台協防? 卜睿哲:可能導致美中斷交" [Will the US military re-station in Taiwan to assist in defense? Richard Bush: This may lead to a severance of diplomatic relations between the US and China]. 联合新闻网. Retrieved 2025-04-05.
  34. ^ 记者:丘采薇 (2020-09-28). "最新民調:若中共犯台 六成台灣人認為美軍會協防台灣" [Latest poll: If the CCP invades Taiwan, 60% of Taiwanese believe that the US military will help defend Taiwan]. 联合新闻网. Retrieved 2025-04-05.
  35. ^ "ET民調/共機頻擾台 55.7%支持「美軍駐台」協防台灣" [ET Poll/Communist aircraft frequently harass Taiwan; 55.7% support "U.S. troops stationed in Taiwan" to assist in the defense of Taiwan]. ETtoday新闻云. 2020-10-04. Retrieved 2025-04-05.
  36. ^ "快評:拜登與特朗普不同 台灣民調數據大變化" [Quick Comment: Biden is different from Trump, Taiwan's poll data has changed dramatically]. 中国评论新闻网. 2020-12-11. Retrieved 2025-04-05.
  37. ^ 谢莉慧 (2022-03-22). "若中共犯台 最新民調:高達五成六不相信美軍會協防台灣" [If the CCP invades Taiwan, the latest poll shows that 56% of people do not believe that the US military will help defend Taiwan]. 新头壳newtalk. Retrieved 2025-04-05.
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  39. ^ 记者:李杰 (2019-11-12). "汪曙申:两岸越融合,民进党越害怕" [Wang Shushen: The more cross-strait integration there is, the more afraid the DPP is]. 中国台湾网. Retrieved 2025-04-05.
  40. ^ 汪曙申 (2020-09-24). "民进党"倚美谋独"必自食恶果" [The Democratic Progressive Party will suffer the consequences of its "relying on the US to seek independence"]. 人民日报海外版. Retrieved 2025-04-05.
  41. ^ "國民黨提案「台美復交、促美協防」 中國官媒驚:什麼用意?" [The Kuomintang proposed "restoring diplomatic relations between Taiwan and the United States and promoting joint defense with the United States." Chinese official media was shocked: What is the intention?]. 自由时报电子报. 2020-10-06. Retrieved 2025-04-05.

U.S.-Taiwan Relations

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